HISTORICAL RESEARCH and DISCOVERY IN PRIVATE LIBRARIES:
Positivism in Comte, Donoso, and Ortega

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GREAT research libraries of the world, such as the Vatican, the Bodleian at Oxford, the Newberry in Chicago, the Huntington at San Marino, the Library of Congress, the British Museum, and the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, contain distinct united “collections” that were once the private libraries of distinguished people, now securely housed for the use of scholars. Uncounted and often unidentified officially, a great many other private libraries of dead or living notables survive intact, not within national, presidential, university, city and other libraries but in residences, mansions, castles, and “museums” which often preserve not only the books but archival papers and personal memorabilia of such persons in situ, where they have lived and worked. If these locations are still the homes of widows, children, or descendants, the libraries are inaccessible, unless the researcher can obtain permission. Whether difficult or easy of access, one’s efforts to utilize private libraries, while sometimes frustrating, can be richly rewarded by dis-


2 To locate out-of-the-way private libraries sometimes can be more difficult than gaining access. If the library (and/or archives) are not catalogued or in central locations, the National Archives in Madrid is of little help. The National Archives in Paris routed me to Mme. Bonazzi, who graciously assisted not only with locations but with letters of introduction. If the family is not always resident at that location, one's first visit may be in vain, as was mine to Montalembert's castle at La Roche-en-Brenil in 1971. For example, the papers and books of Gabriel García y Tassara (ambassador to Washington during the U.S. Civil War) were conveyed by his descendants in Seville to the Menéndez y Pelayo Library in Santander, where they remain “lost.”
covery. Research procedures involved, moreover, are an officially neglected but vital adjunct of historical method.

Among the private libraries I have examined (or sought to examine) were those of Juan Donoso Cortés (1809-1853) at Don Benito in western Spain, of Auguste Comte (1798-1858) in Paris, and José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) in Madrid. All three related to my continuing research on variations of positivism. They provided me with significant discoveries on that subject or on other matters important to past or present research projects that are "revisionist" in character.

When I undertook these investigations in 1971 and 1973-74, I did not imagine that I was doing anything original, but I did not know how old and yet how new was this kind of library research—largely because it had not been specifically touted as a new technique, procedure, or research aid, although studies of this type have been increasing in number and sophistication over the past 20-25 years. Of Peter Laslett's recent triumph with John Locke's library I was only dimly and indirectly aware, although briefer reporting (e.g., A.J.P. Taylor on the Beaverbrook Library) had become fairly commonplace in Britain; nor did I realize that this type of research had become so important for American

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What I attempted, therefore, was simply a personal response to problems that I could not answer any other way; it was not an imitation of another's research model but an instinctive extension of research methods. Some historians had already been "doing history" that way, others will continue to do so, and many more might do it if the approach were made more open and explicit, exemplified by pursuit of a specific research problem—in this case, related varieties of off-beat positivism.

If one is a historian (intellectual, literary, cultural, biographical, or even social or political) dealing with notables in the worlds of mind, culture, taste, or politics, the books in their personal libraries are important keys, or indices, to their mentality, inclinations, style, judgment, and relationships. Almost every figure that played even a modest role in one or more of those areas of historical reality poses difficult problems of interpretation in regard to ideological structure and characteristics, the source of leading ideas, the influence of his own works, intriguing parallels with others, etc., which cannot be firmly settled from evidence in the published Complete Works of . . ., sometimes not even from correspondence and other private papers in the archives. Evidence from the books can at least strengthen a documented and well-argued case.

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Sometimes the only conclusive support for an hypothesis, especially about influences and affiliations, may be in the books, pamphlets, journals, and newspapers he read and kept. Marginal notes and summaries from key authors and works, or extracts and clippings—where they exist—may confirm an influence that otherwise can only be guessed or inferred. Where notebooks and other private papers relatable to the books and other publications are kept in an archives associated with the library, as is often the case, comparison of one with the other can be very informative. At times, however, what is missing or concealed can be as revealing as a document or book sought in vain. Discovery of the unexpected or unknown, too, may be one's reward for the sneezes and eye-strain suffered over dusty trivia, but even such "junk" material may as a whole reveal something important about a mind or an era. Apart from books and papers, moreover, the furnishings and memorabilia often preserved at "on-site" private libraries can provide very useful clues to the character, habits, foibles, virtues and vices of those long dead and nondescript in terms of personality.

From research into the contents of private libraries, one can gain advantages that transcend problems of interpretation relating to an individual, viz., evidences about the international, and perhaps inter-generational, influence of authors and styles or "schools" of thought. The individual gains in stature and transparency by being put in context, that is, by being related in life, thought, and style to other broader attitudes and movements or to the transformation, even "up-ending" (or "inversion"), of such. Books in a man's library, especially if personally annotated or excerpted, might confirm something little developed or even unsuspected in the world of scholarship, as the penetration, extension, modification, and partial survivals in other men, fields, eras, and geographical areas of concepts, philosophies, ideologies, and movements of an intellectual or cultural type, such as: Whiggish worldviews, Newtonianism, Hegelianism, Saint-Simonian and Comtean positivism; the Enlightenment, Romanticism, or Realism; diffusion of French culture, etc.⁶

⁶After Montaigne, Jonathan Swift was one of the first whose respect for precious books did not prevent him from filling them with notes, summaries, and criticisms. Although the traditional reverence was still strong in the nineteenth century, Coleridge and Southey both scribbled up their books (Edwards, Libraries and Founders, pp. 80, 94-97; Williams, Swift's Library, pp. 62ff). Donoso Cortés, however, never marked up his books but preferred to make extracts and notes instead, as is true of many collector-users even today.

⁷For example, see E. B. Burns, "The Enlightenment in Two Colonial Brazilian
In view of the advantages already derived from combining textual and archival research with careful examination of private libraries, it is surprising that this procedure has not yet been emphasized in the manuals for scholarly research used in history graduate schools. To be most fruitful, research in private libraries should be combined with other orthodox research methods and with other sources of information. The special methods may or may not incorporate library science methods with those of history. They need not be as complicated (arcane at times) as those of Laslett on Locke, but more is required than mere patience and perseverance in libraries usually less commodious than Taylor's air-conditioned and well-lighted Beaverbrook. One must be alert for the out-of-place and unusual, even while pursuing a given problem. Above all one should make careful comparison of books with other books, with the published works, with archival papers of all kinds, and with the known dates, events, crises, and turning points of the notable's life and career. The comparative approach may even include collating one private library with another in contents and structure, as a way to get a larger perspective than a single library can afford on problems of the diffusion of distinct types of culture, mentality, ideas, or ideology. This technique is more infrequent but it is not an untested one, as Gary Will's recent study of Jefferson shows. Such is the approach adopted here to investigate the diffusion of a variety of positivism.

To be historically useful, the research procedure need not attempt

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8 One can survey the multitudinous general works on historiography and research methodology (as distinct from librarianship and library histories) and find scarcely any reference to this neglected (by historians) source of evidence, the private library. More attention has been given to university, presidential, and great research libraries in special studies and in these manuals and reflections—e.g., Jesse H. Shera, *Nations, Books, and Libraries* (Cleveland, 1953), pp. 94-102 on library history—but to combine this with any attention to private libraries is evidently rare, e.g., John F. McDermott, *Research Opportunities*, pp. 25-26, in reference to his *Private Libraries in Creole Saint Louis* (1938) and one other work. Recent bibliographies on historical method contain nothing on the utility of private libraries for research: Alexander Birkos and L. A. Lambs, *Historiography, Method, History Teaching: A Bibliography of Books and Articles in English, 1965-1973* (Hamden, Conn., 1975); Lester D. Stephens, *Historiography: A Bibliography* (Metuchen, N.J., 1975). Nor does one find anything very relevant on this method for research in *Library Literature* (“Research Technique”), nor in *Private Library* (quarterly journal of the Private Library Association). What instruction or discussion of method or technique as can be found are apparently only in studies which “do it,” but are not explicitly offered as methodology.
total recall in the "reconstruction" of a private library, but only recognized major authors and works in addition to those relating to the problem. Production of a formal catalogue alphabetically listing all books, pamphlets, etc., with all available identifying detail (binding, size, condition, etc., besides place, publisher and date) is laudable thoroughness, but it may go so far beyond the needs of the case that it may have a very marginal utility. However, analysis of the overall character of the library, of its constituent parts or fields and their relative distribution in the whole, as well as time of purchase, will contribute much to understanding the man or to answering the problem. Later scholars with other problems would obviously benefit from a complete catalogue, but from considerations of a readable treatise or merely of publication, that may not be feasible.

I. Ideological Connections in Private Libraries

Instances where the contents of private libraries have established the influence of one powerful mind upon another, could strengthen the conclusions of textual analysis and circumstantial evidence, or at least make the relationship problematical, include the discovery of the *Leviathan* and other works of Thomas Hobbes in John Locke's library, the presence of the *Principia Mathematica* and other writings of (and on) Isaac Newton in Adam Smith's library, and the un-discovery of G. B. Vico's *New Science* in Montesquieu's library. The Newtonianism of Smith's moral and economic system of checks and balances is now fairly well established, it seems, by A. S. Skinner, without direct reference to the library, which could buttress the argument. In contrast, the influence of Vico's cyclical historicism on Montesquieu's historical or legal thought remains uncertain, even unlikely now since the researches (largely but not wholly negative) of Robert Shackleton. Peter Laslett's critical exploitation of another scholar's discovery in a library at Cambridge of an early personal copy of John Locke's *Treaties on Government*, which he went on to compare with other "lost" but rediscovered and reconstituted parts of the Locke library at Ben Dampf Forrest and the known portion at the Bodleian, resulted in the radical revision of traditional assumptions about Locke's political intent but confirmed assumptions about Hobbes' influence on his political theory as a whole. The two Treatises were *not* written to justify the Glorious Revolution, but Locke *was* well acquainted
in those tracts with Hobbes’ ideas, even though it was Filmer he was answering therein.⁶

Mere presence, or absence, of a book in someone’s library proves nothing by itself about influence, of course, because, if there, he may not have used it, regardless of whether he bought it or whether it were a presentation copy; or, if not there, he may have owned it and lost it, or he may have borrowed it and returned it. But, if close and frequent similarities in the structure of thought and vocabulary appear (more so than in the case of Vico and Montesquieu), it is reasonable to infer that the one was familiar with the other, was even influenced or indebted, however great or “independent” the two thinkers involved, as Hobbes and Locke, or Comte and Ortega. The libraries may let one convert an inference into a demonstrated fact.

The three private libraries (Donoso Cortés’, Comte’s, and Ortega y Gasset’s) which I investigated in one manner or another proved to be interconnected in indirect ways pointing to a very limited international diffusion of a particular kind of positivist thought, over longer than a century’s time. These three libraries related to my researches into offbeat positivisms of a generally Saint-Simonist or Comtist type, or variations and developments from such. One library led me to the others, after I had discovered conceptual and terminological evidences of Saint-

Simonism peculiarly like Comte’s in Donoso’s *Works*, which I sought to confirm first from his library and then from Comte’s.\(^{10}\) Evidences of a sometimes similar yet very different development of Comtean positivism that I detected in Ortega sent me to his library and archives in search of Comte’s works, or possibly even unpublished writings on Comte. What was left of Donoso’s library and archives I investigated thoroughly from every angle, even trying to reconstruct part of the original holdings; Comte’s “public” library I could study at length through its catalogue or on its shelves, but a private portion I had to rummage through with indecent haste; similarly, I searched through that part of Ortega’s which was available for public use, but for the larger still private sections I had to settle for a vicarious and very limited search.

The results of the searches, except partly so in Ortega’s case, did not turn up what I had been looking for, but the other two instances produced a variety of unexpected finds. On the question of positivism mainly, I was able to connect Comte directly to both Donoso Cortés and Saint-Simon by the physical evidence of his books, although no critical analyst had ever believed his protests of independence from the latter anyway.\(^{11}\) The remnant of Donoso’s library and archives as it presently exists does not contain any of Saint-Simon’s or Comte’s works or extracts, although he evidently had acquired at least one book by a Saint-Simonian.\(^{12}\) Nevertheless, I did discover in the similar contents of his and Comte’s libraries additional explanations for the very marked coincidences in the structure and terminology of their thought. Ortega’s library was found to harbor, in its separate parts, all of Comte’s works that were of any consequence. While it is clear that Donoso influenced Ortega very little, if at all—such was not my concern anyway—the latter discovery impelled me into a closer critical examination of Ortega’s published works in order to determine the degree and kind of influence exercised on his mind by Comtean ideas, an influence previously not noted, or at least not developed. Discoveries unrelated to positivism in Donoso’s library and archives revealed, among other things, the truly “European” character of his mind, long before Costa and Ortega popularized “Europeanization” for Spain. Ortega turns out to


\(^{11}\) F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), p. 123: “Comte was the greatest Saint-Simonian” of them all.

\(^{12}\) See footnote No. 26 below (Buchez).
be not so Germanic and existentialist in outlook and basic ideas as generally assumed, but "neo"-positivist, even Comtean, in important respects. The romantic, essentially non-scientistic bent of Comte's later thought is only further underlined by re-examination of his libraries, as is the argument that he ceased to grow intellectually.

The existence of "two Comtes" and of two or more positivism has been recognized ever since Comte's arguments with Spencer, Mill, and Littré, all of whom accepted much of the earlier "realistic" and scientistic Comte but rejected the later, romantic, moralizing, "religious," authoritarian Comte. For the next half-century and more the world at large chose to honor the former and to ignore the latter, except for the strict, or cultic Comtists in Paris, London, and Brazil. In the 20th century, with the demise of the old generic positivism, as scholars have been rediscovering the "forgotten" Comte as well as Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonians, one of the earliest—but ignored—of revisionists was Ortega. Although this revisionism has been a much quieter affair, it is all strangely reminiscent of the still current embroglio between "neo" and orthodox Marxists over the "true" Marx—the younger, romantic, revolutionary, moralistic Marx of the re-discovered pre-1844 manuscripts and the Communist Manifesto vs. the older, realistic, scientific, perhaps evolutionary Marx of Das Kapital. The differences, of course, are

13 See Frank E. Manuel, Prophets of Paris (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 267, on Comte regarding Littré and Mill as "pseudo-positivists" and pp. 265-266 on the romantic, religious Comte, on his "two careers." J. S. Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism (Philadelphia, 1866), pp. 2-3: As a general "mode of thought" positivism was "widely spread" by the time of Comte's "systematization" of it. Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason; A History of Positivist Thought, tr. N. Guterman (Garden City, N.Y., 1968), also refers to two "phases" of Comte's thought—the first scientistic, the second "historiosophic," utopian, and religious (pp. 46-47). Like Ortega he refers to the "'viable' Comte" and the "'forgotten' Comte," the Romantic Comte (p. 71).


marked: Not only do there survive no “orthodox” Positivists, nor “true believers” either, to give battle publicly in this scholarly inquest; the whole parallel of earlier and later is inverted, since the young Comte was (presumably) scientific and the young Marx romantic, etc. The parallel is, nevertheless, too striking to ignore. In both cases, of course, there are those who insist on the unity of character and thought, on the consistency of development of these thinkers, by which they mean the paramount value of one or the other halves.16 The unifying and reconciling kind of interpretation which I attempted with the “two Donosos,” however, imposed a positivism onto both the young doctrinaire liberal and the older authoritarian conservative.17

According to Leszek Kolakowski—“The term ‘positivism’ does not refer simply to a specific philosophical doctrine. . . . It is also used in connection with a specific theory of law, a particular current in literary history, and a characteristic treatment of a number of theological questions.” These are not arbitrary uses of the word, because “a common intellectual attitude [is] to be discerned in them all,” and they are as truly positivism as is the current “stereotype” of it.18 Although W. M. Simon has tried to “nail down” this scientific stereotype as the only “real” positivism by an analytic process of exclusion based upon too narrow a delimiting of the interests and attitudes involved in 19th-century positivism,19 views similar to Kolakowski’s are to be found in studies by

(Toronto, 1978), pp. 59, 62, 84, 137, 154, on similarities and differences respecting “surrogate” rational and scientific religion, dictatorship of the proletariat, and ultimate ideal society.

16 Jean LaCroix, La Sociologie d’Auguste Comte, however, treats Comte’s thought as a whole and as a unity, although the later romantic Comte and his “positivisme religieux” predominate throughout (p. 80); he distinguishes Comte’s “philosophy of the heart” from his “philosophy of intelligence,” the latter alone having been acceptable to Littré and Mill (p. 72). For such opposite unifying views of Marx see William M. Leogrande, “An Investigation into the ‘Young Marx’ Controversy,” Science and Society XLI, no. 2 (Summer 1977), pp. 129-155, and E. K. Hunt, “A Comment on William Leogrande’s Approach to the ‘Young Marx,’” Ibid. XLII (Spring 1978), 84-89.

17 Graham, Donoso, pp. 9, 14.

18 Kolakowski, Alienation of Reason, pp. v, 70.

19 W. M. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Intellectual History (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963). In order to revise (reverse) the former conception of a broad influence by Comte, Simon regretably concentrates his excellent study too narrowly and specifically—mainly “scientific” methodology, history of science, “positivist” historiography and specific ideas rather than on the suggestive influence of his general historical conceptions and philosophy of history, which even Mill continued to admire. Comte’s religious conceptions, admittedly the daffiest part of the program when regarded specifically, are not much examined for influence, but (p. 159-161) Simon records the politico-religious response of Maurras and Brunetière in relating positivism, Catholicism, and right-wing politics, something which Donoso had done a half-century earlier.
Frank E. Manuel, Georg Igers, and others, in their re-examinations of Saint-Simon, the Saint-Simonians, and Comte—romantic, religious “positivists” all. The variant which I detected in Donoso, after an initial political development of “positive politics,” shared with them a distinctive “religious” interest wholly at odds with the scientific conception of positivism that accorded with Comte’s three stages of the mind—as strictly (even zealously) anti-“theological” (and anti-religious) movement of Western rationalistic and scientific thought.

Obvious notable exceptions to the exaggerated scientistic attitude among later “positivists” and “neo-positivists” were Renan, Durkheim, and Weber—a forerunner and the creators of the so-called “sociology of religion” (Weber), according to which man is a being essentially “religious” (in a generic, not specific or cultic manner). Like Frederic Harrison of the latter-day cultic Comtists, Pareto, and Ortega too, they or their followers have viewed nationalism, utopian socialism, and also much of the Marxism after Marx as essentially religious manifestations of a commitment, or “will to believe,” and as more “normal” in the history of mankind than agnosticism or unbelief.

20 See works in n.13 & 14 above, especially Igers, pp. 45, 58ff, 60, 73, 98, 190-191ff: The Saint-Simonian “theology” and “church,” as reflections of a “Catholic prototype”—similar to observations often made about Comte and his Cult of Humanity.


way, Donoso had argued the same point against mid-century socialism and Saint-Simonist cults of humanity or of “humanism.” The apparent absurdity of avowed atheists like Saint-Simon, Comte, and Lenin establishing cults of atheistic humanism argues something for the validity of such sociological, or psychological, opinion, although it has been very ill-taken, as Crane Brinton observed. Laslett and Manuel have commented on the intense or almost fanatic interest in Christian unitarianism evidenced by the libraries and later work of Locke and Newton respectively, those two seminal minds and influences on the Enlightenment (who are also regarded as forefathers of positivism), but whose arcane interests embarrassed into silence other enlightened “positivist”-spirited philosophers and scientists of the 18th century. Again, a parallel with Comte’s cultic credulity and his manqué reception by the later 19th century is obvious.

II. Donoso Cortés (1809-1853): Reconstructing a Lost Library and a Mind

The library of Donoso which was still extant was almost as much of a disappointment as the related archives and vital relics were to prove useful. In the care of an octogenarian great-grandnephew, Sr. Manuel Donoso Cortés (d. 1977), a kindly and courtly gentleman, the library that he claimed had originally comprised around 5,000 volumes, and still almost 1,000 before sacking by local “reds” in 1938, contained in 1971 only about 50 authors and around 130 works, most of which were either the Latin classics or medieval and modern works of religious piety and theology—none of which were annotated or marked up with his opinions and summaries or cryptograms in the manner of Swift or Locke. The sadly shrunken collection clearly was not representative of the whole of Donoso’s original library but reflected the conservative classical and religious tastes of the relative who had selected that portion. It did not now hold what I had hoped to find: viz., the early

23 Graham, Donoso, p. 278.
25 Harrison and Laslett, Library of Locke, p. 23. Manuel, Isaac Newton, Historian (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 5. For the religious theme also seeming curiously out of character, see Sanford, Thomas Jefferson and His Library—on his “religious attitudes” revealed by his books, p. 15 and Ch. 4 (pp. 115-143) and pp. 144-151 on his “liberal religion” and keen interest in study of comparative religions.
26 Graham, Donoso, pp. 82-83, note 18. Of course, possibly Don Manuel was claiming a greatly inflated size, derived erroneously from his grandparents; perhaps the division was not equal among the heirs, some settling for few or no books. Had the library
secular works, such as those of the French doctrinaire liberals, or especially those of Saint-Simon or of Comte, which could have “clinched” my hypothesis that Donoso had been covertly a young Saint-Simonian who developed a “positive politics” in ways parallel, often strikingly similar in terminology, to Comte, only to “invert” this “positivism” in his last years in cyclic, religious ways, still similar in outline to Comte, but finally opposite in meaning. Such had been the “structure” of his thought that I had worked out and for which I had been able to find some confirmation in his references to the Saint-Simonians and the ideology of his newspaper associates. Nor did I find the Saint-Simonist “missing link” in surviving bound volumes (Tomes) of notes and extracts, nor in the loose packets of sundry papers and letters (Legajos) in the family archive at the same site.

survived almost intact until 1937, its estimated 1,000 volumes could have included all known and probable works not presently there. That number is more than adequate, because Donoso was a working collector, an “omnivorous bibliophile,” who purchased books for current interests and projects and meant to read them, including the classics and religious works which relate closely to different stages of his life. A further consideration: he probably did not buy all the early secular works but borrowed some from friends and from the Ateneo, of which he was a member, having made lists of books in it and in the royal libraries as though he had access to use them. Regrettably, the Ateneo’s current catalogue evidently does not contain nearly all that it once held, whatever the source of the losses.

27 Ibid., pp. 17, 36, 48 (Borrego and the Correo Nacional), 97, 106-107. For Donoso’s earlier references to Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians, see his Obras Completas, ed. J. Juretschke (Madrid, 1946), I, 315, 316, 469. He noted that they offered the public “in the name of religion, their religious and social pantheism” and “evangelical equality” tantamount to “political slavery”; while he regarded their principles, drawn from Saint-Simon and Condorcet, as “fecund,” he thought the applications ridiculous or absurd. He found Saint-Simon in agreement with his doctrinaire “sovereignty of intelligence” of “the better.” Later he adverted to The Globe, which was the Saint-Simonians’ newspaper, as “edited by young men of the highest hopes,” some famous, others “of less renown,” but no copies survived in his library (I, 798). The only book relevant to Saint-Simonism now in the library is Alfred Sudre’s Histoire du Communisme, ou réfutation historique des utopies socialistes (Paris, 1849), which had a chapter on Saint-Simon but nothing on Marx or Comte. See my Donoso Cortés (p. 276) for reference to another book (not now in the library but once in his possession) in which Comte’s name appears—once. Another absent book, evidently bought in 1849, was P.J.B. Buchez, an ex-Saint-Simonian, Essai d’une traité complet de philosophie du point de vue du Catholicisme et de progrés, which is included on a purchase list in Legajo 25 of the archives. Possibly this book influenced his inversion of positivism. For other evidence on Spanish Saint-Simonists not cited in my book, see: Rouchdi Fakkar, Sociologie, socialisme et internationalisme prémarixistes: L’influence de Saint-Simon (Neuchâtel, Biblioth. de sociologie et de science pol., 1968), pp. 181, 182 (Francisco Pi y Margall and railway and publishing schemes). The one work of Comte which Donoso was most likely to have read in the 1830s was the so-called Opuscules, a probable source of his “positive politics,” although to his mind then, that early work would not have stood out as anything but Saint-Simonian.
In order to build up a broader profile of Donoso’s mind and tastes, I was able from these remnants and from culling the published works and earlier “catalogues” and studies prior to 1937 to establish many, at least, of the notable authors he possessed from antiquity to past the mid-19th century—at least a hundred, many with complete or multiple works, and as many more rather obscure writers from his own times. Major modern authors from Machiavelli to Proudhon that he had once possessed—and mostly read—could be identified from his notes, extracts, and published textual references. Obviously, however, such a posthumously reconstructed ghost library, while not hypothetical, lacked solid evidence of some recent and important secular works and writers that I had good reason to think he had possessed—and not just Saint-Simon’s works and the Saint Simonians’ Doctrine, but Hegel, the “utopian socialists,” possibly even Marx’s Communist Manifesto. None of these were in the remnant of the library now at Don Benito, not even Proudhon, which we absolutely know he had—only Lamartine’s complete works (4 vols., Paris, 1835) and a minor work on law by Savigny—nor any of the great authors of the Enlightenment, in which he had been educated, and few even of Romanticism, in which he was well read.

Fortunately, in the case of Hegel and numerous other authors, I discovered in the Legajos hitherto ignored scraps of paper in Donoso’s handwriting which proved to be purchase lists that he had carried to book shops around Paris on his several trips there from 1839 through 1851; on them were one of Hegel’s works, the Ästhetik in French translation, and Wilme’s four volumes on German philosophy from Kant through Hegel. This helped to establish that his subsequent use of dia-

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28 The so-called “catalogue” of Donoso’s library is actually a catalogue of the archives; the books were not catalogued in 1853 before division, nor at any time afterward. More than this number can be determined from the names in the text and notes of my Donoso Cortés, pp. 83-87, 100-103, 126-128 and from the Legajos of loose papers, especially #25, which has several purchase lists with many insignificant authors, notably on religious topics and hagiography, but also such noted authors as Newman, Döllinger, Görres, Lamennais, Ozanam, Dupanloup, and J. A. Möhler, and such works as Guizot’s Histoire des origines du gouvernement représentatif; Thier’s vols. 9 and 10, evidently of Histoire de la Révolution française (1827); Proudhon’s Idée générale de la révolution au 19e siècle; Burke’s Lettre sur la Révolution française; and Blanc de Saint-Bonnet’s De la Restauration française.

29 Both authors, Marx and Hegel, are more or less implied in Donoso’s Essay (1851). For the background of that book, Veuillot sent him a package of socialist books and tracts from Paris, but only Proudhon can be identified for certain as among them. The “dialectic” in the Essay could have been inspired by Proudhon but clearly had other more immediate and reliable sources as well. (Letter in “Fonds Veuillot,” VI, Bibliothèque Nationale.)
lectical terminology was not wholly uninformed, mere second-hand imitation of Proudhon’s misuse in *Philosophy of Poverty*, which Marx denounced as “poverty of philosophy.” The discovery of Leibniz’s *Works* and *Thoughts* in the library and with notes also demonstrated a hitherto unsuspected influence on his philosophical reflections about perennial questions of faith and reason, good and evil, space and time. Leibniz is also very possibly the source of Donoso’s emphatic but puzzling use of “affirmation” and “negation” in place of the usual positivist terminology (still evident in Ortega) of “positive” and “critical” (or “negative”).

When one puts Hegel and Leibniz together with the ample archival evidence of serious study of numerous other “great works” and authors of the Western tradition, the sum shows clearly enough that, while Donoso was not really an independent philosopher, he was the leading “Europeanizing” intellectual, writer, and political theorist in Spain in his generation. The late publication dates of some of his purchases (1851-1853) show that he was (as Montalembert remarked) intellectually and culturally avid, open, and growing and changing to the end. This is a very different picture from what had previously been his image, both in Spain and abroad: a second-rate Traditionalist philosopher, a flamboyant romantic stylist, more than a serious thinker, who moved narrowly in the footsteps of DeMaistre and Bonald. Thus Valera and Ortega regarded him. “Scratch” him deeply and he turns out to be, however, as Ortega said of Valera, a “positivist” of sorts, highly inventive and a whole generation ahead of Valera and other Spaniards. A literary type of “content analysis” and structuralist implications can sometimes provide evidence which the accidents of history and the material interests of heirs so often destroy.

**III. Auguste Comte (1798-1857) “A Skeleton in the Closet” of “The Positivist Library”**

At No. 10 Rue M. lePrinc, in the apartment where he lived, everything remaining as it was on the day he died, is the modest “working” library of Auguste Comte. Always in straitened circumstances, Comte

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was not one of the world's great collectors nor, to judge by the little he seems to have read in later years, did he have much love of books or reading in themselves. All or most of the wide and representative reading of his earlier years seems to have been not for enjoyment but strictly utilitarian: to provide himself with the breadth of knowledge in a variety of fields that would enable him to construct his own tableau of historical development of the European mind, society, and culture from antiquity to his own times. Many have been persuaded that actually Comte simply embellished and extended, made more systematic, the inspired insights of the rather disorganized mind of Saint-Simon. Steeped in esprit de système, Comte lost his intellectual curiosity after middle age; what he had not already ingested into his dogmatic "positive" system no longer seemed worth knowing. He turned ever more moralistic, "religious" and involuted, producing only variations on the central themes of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, or developing out of his store of ideas and inner recesses formerly inchoate or obscured parts of his thought, as in the early Opuscules ("Positive Politics"), like a spider spinning an ever denser cobweb of much the same shape at the beginning and end, even if the middle part had looked very different.

That essentially anti-intellectual attitude did not prevent Comte, nevertheless, from accumulating a representative library in several fields, nor from dictating to his followers and disciples what they should read. As he catalogued the human types and personalities to fill his new positivist calendar and to serve as saints of his new dispensation, the godless Church of Humanity, so he selected books (about 130 authors and 160 works) to fit the preconceived niches and purposes of his "Positive Library" (Bibliothèque Positiviste), an early version of the "Great Books Club." This was considerably more restrictive in subject matter and specific notable selections than his smaller personal library still on display in his apartment, about 90 authors and 120 distinct works and collected works, neither of which is perhaps the most impressive collection for one of the acknowledged "great minds" of the 19th century, the

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32 Many have commented on Comte's passion for system, e.g., Frederic Harrison, The Positive Evolution of Religion, p. 276: "Comte did not invent positivism as a form of thought, but only reduced it to a system. . . ."

father of "sociology," who also gave to the half century after his death the name "positivism," as signifying its "scientific" objectivity and passion for facts and "laws" in the social and human studies. That meaning which the world at large adopted from his renegade disciple Littré, who rejected all that nonsensical religiosity and moralism, was what Ortega called the "false official Comte," that is, not the genuine positivism of "that genial madman, Auguste Comte."^34

What had brought me to the Museé Positivist and the Maison d'Auguste Comte in 1974 was not just a tourist's curiosity but a desire to see his library, precisely because of a strange coincidence of terminology and conception between his *Appeal to Conservatives* (1855) and Donoso's *Essay* of 1853. It was as if Comte had read the Essay, had seen through its inversion of Saint-Simonist positivism, and was taking pains to rectify it, although in large part agreeing with it.^35 No copy of the Essay, however, was in his library, which in itself (especially in Comte's case) proves nothing, any more than the fact that no reference to Donoso appears in his works, for, as Frank Manuel observes, he rarely named contemporaries.^36 The assistant curator, M. Pierre Arnaud, however, had told me of another "secondary" library of no consequence shelved out of sight in the closet of a different room. My curiosity was whetted but unappeased, so, after several days of research there in journals and books, I returned on another (a non-working) day, just before having

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^34 Ortega, *Obras Completas* IV, 135 (*Rebelion de las Masas*, 1930), V, 204. Ortega's view of Comte anticipated that of Manuel, *Prophets of Paris*, pp. 8-9: "mad" perhaps but with a "touch of genius", also on distinguishing the real Comte (a "religious" fanatic) from the "pseudo-positivists," Littré and Mill (pp. 266-267).

^35 See Graham, *Donoso*, pp. 272-274, on Donoso's attempted "inversion," comparable to the Nietzschean "reversal of values" which Ortega was to make into a leading concept ("inversion" or "reversal") of his theory of "historic crisis"; Ortega, *Man and Crisis* (New York, 1958), p. 132 f. Also see a relevant work which I investigated subsequent to my book's publication: Henri de Lubac, *Le Drame de l'Humanisme Athée*, 4th ed. rev. (Paris, 1950), Ch. 3, "Transpositions positivistes," pp. 222-225, on Comte's own previous inversion of medieval Christianity (as he conceived it) into his atheistic Religion of Humanity and on his later disavowal of "religious" (i.e., Christian) positivists as "false" positivists (p. 224). J. S. Mill even then noticed this strange transposition in Comte in *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (Ann Arbor, 1958). Frederic Harrison, Comte's English disciple most faithful to the spirit (if not the letter) of the Religion of Humanity, was at pains to deny for himself and his little group this odd but (in Comte) undeniable imitation. *On Society* (1918; New York, 1971), pp. 363, 365.

^36 Manuel, *Prophets* . . . (p. 275) notes Comte's "annoying" habit of referring to people obliquely "without any direct mention of their names," so that identification becomes "an intellectual guessing game," e.g., his allusions to Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians and (in my case) the work and author that prompted the *Appeal to Conservatives*. 
to leave Paris. The custodian let me inspect the closet briefly to see if the Essay might be there. It was not, but to my surprise several of Saint-Simon's volumes were there, along with much truly of no consequence, under a century of dust.\(^{37}\) Having insisted long and loud that he owed little or nothing to the ideas of Saint-Simon, on at least one occasion, Comte did acknowledge his debt to Saint-Simon: "Les doctrines sociales de Saint-Simon, jointes au naturalisme de Cabanis et de Broussais, donnèrent naissance au 'positivisme' d'Auguste Comte. Ce dernier, comme Saint-Simon, voit dans la science sociale ou 'sociologie' le terme et le but de toutes les recerches scientifiques."\(^{38}\) Comte had thus concealed the works of his former master rather than display them publicly as he ought to have done in all honesty. He had, you might say, hidden a "skeleton in his closet." What careful analysts had maintained long since, viz., that Comte was always heavily indebted to Saint-Simon for his basic "positivist" ideas,\(^{39}\) is supported to a degree by this little discovery.

A comparison of Comte's list of "The Positivist Library in the 19th Century" (1851) with Comte's own library (catalogued as "usual" and "auxilliary")\(^{40}\) in the Maison d'Auguste Comte is awkward because the catalogue and the list are differently constructed, the former without apparent rhyme or reason except for the books' positions on the shelves, the latter according to subject, century, or nation. Both, of course, contain Comte's own productions (in preference to Martineau's 2 volumes and Littré's one volume on The Positive Philosophy—in the Catalogue), but neither includes Saint-Simon. A quick check of the other items reveals a close similarity in general, but many works of the Catalogue are not in Comte's list, and (fewer) vice-versa. There are no surprises about his selections in philosophy in either record, except perhaps Leibniz's Esprit (2 vols.; 1772) being included in the Catalogue only,

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\(^{37}\) Much of this hidden library consisted of manuals and notebooks apparently related to his tutoring, besides a number of minor authors.

\(^{38}\) Comte, quoted in Herbert Spencer, Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte and Other Essays (1864) ed. D. A. Hansen (Berkeley, 1968), appendix (source not cited, only the page, 422).

\(^{39}\) For example, see Manuel, Prophets . . . , pp. 275, 306; Lacroix, Sociologie, pp. 14, 62.

\(^{40}\) Catalogue des Bibliothèques (Usuelle I and II; Auxiliare I and II). Harrison, Among My Books, pp. 395-438, reprints Comte's list with laborious reconstruction of full titles, editions, dates, publishers, and places. He even attempted to update it in 1886 with more recent editions (where possible) of ancient, medieval, and modern "classics," a hopeless task since its recent modern selections were already largely antedated when Comte first made the list in 1851.
but exclusions (from the List only) of virtually all specific works and authors which were skeptical or anti-religious (Lucretius, Montaigne, Hobbes, Bayle, Hume, Voltaire, Holbach, Destutt de Tracy, even Pascal's *Provincial Letters*) is noteworthy. Evidently, having settled on the necessity of his natural religion of Humanity, Comte did not want his converts' credulity disturbed by such critical works. Also, Catholic religious classics (Augustine, Bernard, Kempis, Bossuet, Pascal's *Pensees*) and his own *Positive Catechism* were on the List, but no Protestant works, which were also omitted as critical. Curiously, "Philosophy and Religion" (Part IV—last but not least) were mingled together; in fact, of the four divisions only Literature and Science were unmixed with works from other fields, although the latter included mathematics and several works of psychology, it seems.

Even more curious is the fact that although his second major work was *Système de Politique Positive* (4 vols.; 1851-54), he included no section on politics, nor on economics, and, understandably, nothing yet specifically on "sociology." Of course, since his "Positive Politics" was finally more concerned with religion than statecraft, it fitted easily under philosophy and religion, along with Aristotle's *Politics*. Otherwise, political studies are absent from the List, except for Bossuet's *Politique tirée*.... under religion and Richelieu's *Political Testament* under History, which did include some political histories, such as Hume's *England*. The great political works of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau did not make it from Catalogue to List, but even Maistre's *Considerations sur la France* and Guizot's *History of the Revolution in England* were thus excluded, and Voltaire's *Age of Louis XIV*. Contemporary political treatises, even Guizot's, evidently did not interest Comte enough to purchase them, nor did Donoso's published speeches or *Essay*, which were easily available in Paris. Economic studies were conspicuously absent from the List, but the Catalogue has only four or five: Colbert's *Testament politique* (1694); Vauban's *Project d'un Dime Royale* (1708); Mercier de la Rivere's physiocratic *L'Order Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés Politiques* (2 vols.; 1767); Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population* (in French, 3 vols.; 1809); and Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (in French, 4 vols.; 1800-01).

Rare indeed, except for his own titles, were works of any kind in Comte's own library or in his *Bibliotheque Positiviste* which were written after he had grown up and matured intellectually. Of noteworthy authors, Byron and Sir Walter Scott were the last on his List in litera-
ture for the Positivist Library; Mignet (*French Revolution*, 1824) and Hallam (*Middle Ages*, 1818) in history; Lagrange, Lamarck, Carnot, and Broussais in science—none later than 1829; and Cabanes and de Maistre in philosophy and religion. The Catalogue for the personal library was only a little more “contemporary,” mostly only later editions but not later authors, except for a very few: J. S. Mill, *System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Deductive* (2 vols.; 1843); Friedrich Strauss, *Vie de Jesus* (2 vols.; 1853); and Lammenais, *De la Religion Considerée dans ses rapports avec l’ordre politique et civil* (1825). Chateaubriand’s *Les Martyrs* (1809) was the most recent work of literature in his Catalogue. Strauss is the only solid evidence that after 1850 he was still reading anyone except himself, for example, Harriet Martineau’s condensation of his *Positive Philosophy* (2 vols.; 1853), which he praised highly. It has been justly claimed, and is supported by this evidence, that Comte ceased to be *aucourrant* in most fields, including science, years before he died, unless he borrowed the books he could not afford to buy. With a few exceptions, the repetitive *content* of his productions, if not their *spirit*, supports the view that he just kept spinning out variations, more refined or more extensive versions, of himself. How odd that the well-educated Harrison, who so unconvincingly denied being a “Comtist,” could acknowledge that Comte’s “Positivist Library” was dated and inadequate (especially in science and history) and yet could promote slavish imitation of it. Only a stubborn “religious” reverence and faith can explain his zealous work to perpetuate such mental cloning, or shrinking of heads to fit a shrunken model of Comte, his master.

It is not strange, in view of the dated character of Comte’s libraries, that I did not find Donoso’s then notorious *Essay* among his books, for if the *Appeal to Conservatives* did not reflect knowledge of it, then it had to be of Blanc de Saint-Bonnet, whose works are also absent—though he may have borrowed both authors, for his knowledge of conservatives was more contemporary than de Maistre, Bonald, and Chateaubriand. Nevertheless, three of Donoso’s earlier works (1834-1837) were in Comte’s library, along with a brief biography of him. These were included in Eugenio de Ochoa’s *Library of Contemporary Spanish Writers* (1840), one of the few later works in Comte’s library. It is not

41 Harrison, *ibid.*, p. 438, concluded his editing and updating of the works in Comte’s Positivist Library by noting: “The whole of the foregoing collection of works, excepting a few scientific manuals, practically obsolete or *introuvable* are now in the Positivist Libraries at Paris, and in London and elsewhere.”
certain that Comte read these selections, of course, or that he would have recognized from them a kindred Saint-Simonist mind in the young liberal.42 A definite connection is thus clearly established between Comte and Donoso, but it is not clear what it meant, if anything.

Leaving out only the science (and mathematics) section, it is surprising how closely Comte's personal and positivist library matches the older works in that of Donoso Cortés. Scores of authors and works are the same. This is not to argue a dependence of the one on the other, because Donoso had accumulated his library before ever Comte published his List, but it is a remarkable coincidence. This perhaps is sufficient to explain the often striking similarity between their systems of thought, reinforcing their common debt to Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians. They did not have to be acquainted with each other's works in order to resemble each other strikingly in numerous ways. Moreover, Donoso's passionate interest in French thought and literature was paralleled by Comte's evident keen interest in Spanish literature, ballads, and drama from *The Cid* and *Don Quixote* on through the great authors of the 17th century, even those writers of much less prestige from his own century. In religious thought both displayed an especially keen interest in Saint Augustine, Bossuet, and de Maistre, with several works and editions of each in the libraries of both men, and, of course, Kempis, Pascal, and Leibniz. Comte, too, possessed a number of lives of saints and popes. Small wonder that Thomas Huxley observed of him: "Catholicism minus Christianity."43 A main difference finally between Comte and Donoso was that the latter followed the earlier Saint-Simonist criticism of Comte in the *Doctrine* and openly, explicitly, projected a cyclic turn in later modern thought toward religion and theology, both secular and super-

42 Eugenio de Ochoa y Ronna, *Una Biblioteca de Escritores Españoles Contemporaneos* (Paris: Baubry-Librairie Europea, 1846), I, 467-498. The works, given only in part (excerpts), were: (1) *Consideraciones Sobre le Diplomacia* (1834), which a Spanish reviewer had charged was inspired by the Saint-Simonist P.J.B. Buchez "and his companions" (Donoso Cortes, *Obras Completas* [Juretschke], I, p. 155, note 16)—a relationship then denied by Donoso; (2) *La Ley Electoral* (1835), which here omitted those pages advocating a politics for "normalcy" and "crisis" situations, which Comte would have certainly regarded as very like his own earlier pamphlet on "Positive Politics" of the 1820s; (3) *Lecciones de Derecho Político* (1836), no. 2 on "sovereignty of the People," which Comte, like Donoso in this context, regarded as "absurd" and "tyrannical," as in the previous work Donoso's "sovereignty of intelligence" (of "the better") would have reminded Comte not only of the doctrinaire liberals (Guizot), but Saint-Simon's elitism, as indeed Donoso pointed out in a later Lección not included in Ochoa (Donoso, *ibid.*, I, 316). 43 Huxley, quoted by George Simpson (ed.), *Auguste Comte, Sire of Sociology* (New York, 1966), p. vii.
naturalist varieties." In this respect Donoso was closer to the other Saint-Simonians; but in politics, closer to Comte.

IV. Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955): "Scratching" to Find a "Positivist"

Ortega's large library was divided as late as 1974 into several locations, part of it at the Instituto Internacional de Boston in Madrid, part of it at the residences of his spouse and heirs. I was particularly anxious to examine it for works on Comte and, if possible, also his papers, which were in the family's possession in Madrid, to see if there were any unfinished manuscripts on Comte among them. In his renowned Revolt of the Masses (1930), Ortega had alluded to his mental exchanges and musings before a bust of Auguste Comte in Paris in 1938, and he had intended to write down his reflections in some "Conversations with Statues," and on another occasion, too, he had promised to write a study of "the unknown Comte." Now Comte is not one of those major influences on Ortega recognized by Julián Marías and other Orteguistas, partly because Ortega was so early critically hostile to "positivism"—although he warned us later not to "confuse positivism with Comtism."


45 At the Instituto Internacional de Boston, I recall hearing an estimate of the total size of Ortega's library as being around 50,000 volumes. If that number is remotely accurate, the source of a large percentage would have been from Ortega's several publishing ventures and from complementary copies presented by authors and publishers seeking favorable attention, a review, or an article from the renowned director of the prestigious Revista de Occidente.

46 Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas, IV, 135 and II, 29 (Historia Como Sistema)—"Comte desconocido."

47 For a good example of Ortega's attitude toward what was popularly known as "positivism," see Obras Completas, II, 22-24. At first (e.g., I, 552), he did not perceive the romantic in Comte. In Julián Marías' recent study, José Ortega y Gasset: Circumstance and Vocation, tr. F. M. Lopez-Morillas (Norman, Okla., 1970), he does not mention Comte as an influence on Ortega, although he calls attention to his earlier French period, especially the influence of Renan and Taine, usually regarded as positivists after a fashion. At the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, however, I found a Bulletin de l'Institut Française en Espagne, 1954-1956 (April, 1956), dedicated to Ortega, in which Julián Marías states: "Et si l'on nous permet ici un rappel de souvenir personnel, c'est sous l'influence d'Ortega que nous avons tenté une expérience qui sans doute n'est pas commune même chez les étudiants du pays voisin [France], celle de lire les cinq ou six mille pages de texte imprimé que représentent les œuvres complètes d'Auguste Comte; Auguste Comte, qu' Ortega considérait comme un philosophe génial, fourmillant d'aperçus qui n'ont pas perdu leur actualité (ainsi cette thèse de la 'modifi"cabilité sociale de l'homme) et d'idées neuves et originales" (pp. 90-91). Evidently Ortega had thus read widely in Comte before his injunction to Marías and also found there a significant number of original ideas still applicable to his times. For example: "The thought of Comte contains much more than a theory of knowledge [the three
I was persuaded years ago, however, of a tacit but substantial debt to Comte in his historical writings and reflections. In fact, in *History As a System* (1935), Ortega expressed a critical admiration of the philosophies of history of Comte and of Hegel, as "works of genius," and his idea of "select men" and their "mission" clearly, admittance, reflected Comte's elitism, as did his notion of a "spiritual" (i.e., cultural and educational) power alongside the "temporal power," or ruling elite. He did indeed "re-read Saint-Simon, [and] Auguste Comte," as he recommended to Julián Marias and to all.

Señora Soledad Ortega y Varelo, daughter of Ortega, informed me at her office at *Revista de Occidente*, that her father's papers were not sufficiently organized to permit use of the archives yet, but she kindly consented to have examined the books still in the possession of the family and to inform me of the results. The list of works by Comte and on Comte which she provided me was impressively long—almost all of Comte's major works (with duplicate later editions), the letters, and several noted studies of Comte—thus confirming to my mind a relationship and dependence hitherto ignored by scholars. Regrettably,
however, the organizer of the archives informed me that he had not yet encountered a manuscript of "Conversaciones con las Estatuas."

Subsequent research in the Complete Works has persuaded me that Ortega's *Man and Crisis* (1933, 1958 tr.) was dependent on Comte and Saint-Simon for its conception of "historical crisis" (alternating "critical" and "normal" epochs), and for other ideas, such as predictability.\(^{50}\) Though openly against positivism as it existed at the beginning of the 20th century and against Comte as he was known then, Ortega later concluded that Comte was not a positivist of that type. He was attracted to the moralistic, romantic Comte, who warned of a profound European crisis impending, if the "Great Western Republic" of Europe were not realized soon. On through what he regarded as the "great crisis" of modern civilization in the 20th century, Ortega continued to call for a "United States of Europe" in Comtean fashion until his death, subsequent to the formation of the E. E. C. On that side, Ortega was a Comtean "positivist" in more than one sense.\(^{51}\)

Another still unguessed, undeveloped, and undocumented (but very probable) relationship between Ortega and the "mad" Comte turns up in regard to what is called "sociology of religion." By his own admission, Ortega retained no belief in Catholicism or in Christianity, but anti-religious atheism or pure agnosticism were alike alien to his way of thinking, to his evaluation of men and history. Like Durkheim, Ortega reveals the continued influence of the early Saint-Simonist and later Comtean preoccupation with religion and the religious "nature" of man, for he more than once maintained that man normally requires some kind of "living faith," or integrating "belief." His frequent emphasis on the difference between *idea* and *belief* (*Ideas y Creencias*) owed more than

have been the source of Ortega's distinction between Littré's scientistic positivism and Comte's "orthodox positivism."

\(^{50}\) See Ortega, *Ob. Comp.*, IV, 96-97, 175; VII, 296-297; IX, 268. At present I am working on both a "General History of Crisis Thought" and on a shorter study of "Ortega's Crisis Theory," in both of which Ortega's relationship to Comte is detailed much more thoroughly than space permits here.

\(^{51}\) For an extensive presentation of Ortega's thought on European unification which is relatively complete but does not suspect the connection with Comte and Saint-Simon, as do none of the several other lesser studies of this subject, see Harold C. Raley, *José Ortega y Gasset: Philosopher of European Unity* (Univ. of Alabama, 1971). Ortega developed this idea especially in *Revolt of the Masses*. The connection with Comte (e.g., see Ortega, *Ob. Comp.*, IV, 1975 and VI, 149 on crisis) is not explicit in this case, but a man admittedly as well-read in Saint-Simon and Comte could not have overlooked so prominent and repetitious an idea, even though he cited Guizot, whose idea of Europe did not include federation into political unity, rather than the founders of positivism.
a little to those distant sources for, like them, he regarded beliefs of some kind to be a "normal" and constantly recurring feature of mankind's history. Periods in which beliefs (or "faiths") disintegrated, were for him eras of deep historic crisis. Not that a belief had to be formally religious in nature. As he put it, the characteristic modern "beliefs" in reason, science, and progress were of the nature of modern secular "faiths," combined in the Enlightenment as the last great collective faith of the West, and similarly as a less general faith in positivism (not the strictly Comtist kind), and most recently in the supposedly "scientific socialism" of Leninist Marxism.\textsuperscript{52}

Not a disinterested observer in the contest between Marxist and fascist faiths (a plague on both), Ortega developed his own "faith" to cope with the great crisis of modern civilization in the first half of the 20th century: A kind of existentialist stoicism, which he called "the disillusioned life," or living without illusions. But he also spoke of "revelations," meaning exemplary "resolutions" or breakthroughs from man's problematic situation in crisis eras of doubt and confusion, e.g., by Descartes and Galileo on reason and science. Such revelations were the basis and beginnings of new faiths, which in turn (so he hoped for his own "beliefs") would lead out of the contemporary crisis into the development of a new humanistic culture. Like faiths, cultures give a relative security to life and thought, in fact always included certain beliefs or basic convictions.\textsuperscript{53} In his own way, Ortega was thus as eager as Comte had been to give the Western world a worldly, secular faith, but one more rational and scientific, not an ersatz, rechauffée religion of topsyturvy "Catholicism" or of a syncretism of world religions into a new universal religion. Though vague in formulation, Ortega's new faith for the future was nevertheless "humanistic," like Comte's (and Marx's). He preserved reason (as "historical" or "vital" reason now) and science (but as less pretentious of knowing and solving everything), but he was not at all sure about ultimate progress as opposed to cycle—just hopeful and optimistic by choice.

\textsuperscript{52} See Ortega, \textit{Ob. Comp.}, IV, 489, 493-500; V, 492, 497-498; VII, 517; VI, 309, 360-365, 407, 408; IX, 569, 656—on these matters and types of secular "faiths," or "beliefs," in cultural and intellectual situations of crisis.

At least one copy of Donoso's selected works was in Ortega's library, but there is no evidence that he ever used it. Little besides a common admiration of Saint-Simonian and doctrinaire-liberal ideas linked them in thought. His one insignificant reference to Donoso in his Obras Completas does not suggest that he ever in his whole life read a line of him. The erroneous reputation of Donoso, praised as the leading Spanish traditionalist and anti-rationalist in the writings of Menéndez y Pelayo and condemned for the same by Juan Valera, whom Ortega admired, was enough to have provoked an initial and invincible dislike or disinterest from the philosopher of Europeanization and of "vital reason." The only evident connection between Ortega's thought and Donoso's was the latter's idea that, periodically, especially in epochs of deep crisis, men manifest a love of the absurd. The same idea is prominent in Ortega—with a different evaluation, of course—but he could as well as not have gotten it through Unamuno, who evidently got it from Donoso directly. Only if he were to have studied Donoso as long and closely as he studied Comte could Ortega have scratched through the surface appearance of the "false Donoso," the fanatic Spanish irrationalist, to Donoso the off-beat positivist and Europeanist, the first notable such combination in Spain. Moreover, despite his inclination to discover leading Renaissance, Mannerist, and Romantic crisis types in Spain—Vives, Don Quixote, El Greco, and Goya—he was totally unprepared to see in Donoso a "forerunner" of the modern crisis, a too early pre-Nietzschean "inverter" of positivism, the characteristic modern system of the

54 Ideario de Donoso Cortés, recopilado por Antonio Porras (Madrid, 1931), 422 pp.; it is located in that part of Ortega's library in the Instituto de Boston, Madrid. It looks used but bears no marks or notes. Some of the earlier selected topics, such as the attack on popular sovereignty in the name of "sovereignty of intelligence" would have interested Ortega (even as Comte, above, note 42), who manifested a similar elitism also related to both Guizot and doctrinaire liberalism on one hand and to Saint-Simon (and Comte) on the other, and (like Donoso) he highly esteemed Guizot's History of Civilization in Europe; see Ortega, Ob. Comp., V, 251-254; also La Rebellion de las Masas, 12th ed. (Madrid, 1955), pp. 20-21 on Guizot's liberalism and his concept of Europe, which Donoso, like Ortega later, combined with a Saint-Simonist notion of European unity. Probably another copy of Donoso's works is in the still private part of Ortega's library, and, if so, is more significant: Donoso Cortés, selected by Antonio Tovarro, 4th ed. (Madrid, 1944), in its first edition (1934?). Soledad Ortega recalled that Tovarro was a friend of the Ortega family, so it is very probable that he presented Ortega with a copy and discussed some of the ideas of Donoso, whom the right-wingers were then reviving as a crisis writer.

later 19th century. Inversion was, for Ortega, one of the key symptoms of deep historic crisis.

V. Character Traits in Artifacts and Surroundings

Even the disposition and setting of private libraries, as well as books, papers, and other material contents, have stories to tell to the critical enquirer. For a Peter Laslett the type or concentration of books, the existence or lack of personal catalogues, the trouble or unconcern shown for their effective arrangement and use, and the care or unconcern shown for their final disposition on the death of the owner all provide insights into the character or foibles of Locke or (for comparison) Newton. The picture of Locke and Goethe literally expiring in their studies amid their beloved books, busy to the last gasp of life and flicker of light, reveals an extraordinary devotion to learning and literature. Comte's testament, which provided for the presentation of his library intact and in situ, shows a concern for his ultimate success and victory in this world that contrasts sharply with Donoso who, finally regarding all such worldly ambition as empty vanitas, thus forever deprived scholars of much substantive evidence on his mind and intent. It is not public knowledge what Ortega's will may have specified about his library, but it survives in identifiable parts.

The content of private libraries, in respect to the distribution between different types (fields) of books, may be instructive about the intellectual interests and literary tastes of the former owner, especially if one can determine more or less the date of purchase from bills, shopping lists, and the like, as I did with Donoso Cortés. This sometimes retrievable information can be very helpful in constructing the profile of a mind in development and change. Books, as much as archival papers, can also aid one in dating (within outer limits) when a traumatic experience, crisis, or critical illness occurred, as well as enabling one to

56 For Ortega's study of these crisis types, see his Ob. Comp., II, 560 (Don Quixote); IV, 449 (El Greco); VII, 536 (Goya); IX, 507 ff., 538 (Vives); on “inversion” as a crisis characteristic, see Ibid., II, 138; IV, 494; IX, 559 ff. Also see Graham, Donoso, p. 274 on Donoso's “inversion” of Comte's positivism.


58 Dr. Robinet (whom Mill described as a “disciple after Comte's own heart”) and other “faithful” carried out his wishes even in small details. J. S. Mill, Comte and Positivism, p. 127, 156, and see p. 179 on the Positivist Library which he regarded as manifesting a despotic and dogmatic mentality with no love of literature and reading.

“flesh out” with substance and content the dry bones of such an event in respect to what influences contributed to a “conversion,” or to marked change of interest, activity, or life-style, again as in the case of Donoso Cortés. Possibly Manuel could have done the same with Newton’s “crisis” of 1693, but he did not do so. Nor has anyone tried to relate Comte’s current reading to his first self-styled “cerebral crisis” of 1827, from which he claimed to have learned by self-analysis the famous “three stages” of the human mind (theological, metaphysical, and scientific), nor, for that matter, to correlate his readings on feminism with his second crisis, or “conversion,” in 1847—after which he elevated his unrequited love for Clotilde de Vaux into a kind of Virgin-Mother cult of his Religion of Humanity and the special affective (love) role assigned to women in his utopian vision of the industrial republics. By contrast, Ortega regarded “feminism” (a more independent and assertive type, to be sure) as symptomatic of great crisis epochs in the history of cultures and civilizations, but not as curative of the problems and disorders.

To relieve the otherwise drab colors and standard lines of a purely intellectual portrait, the library locations may also retain oil portraits, pencilled sketches, lithographs, or photographs of a personage at different stages of life, and of his friends and family. Articles of clothing, adornment, toiletries, and treasured keepsakes may survive in closets, cabinets, desks and display cases. This was the case with Donoso Cortés. Similar lessons were learned at the summer home of his friend, Count Charles de Montalembert, at a 16th-century moated castle, La Roche-en-Brenil, in the Côte d’Or country of Eastern France. There the ar-

60 Graham, ibid., pp. 125-128, 302-303.
61 Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity (London, 1875) I, pp. x, xvii-xviii (Comte’s preface). Ortega, Man and Crisis, p. 133. See Mill, Comte and Positivism, pp. 131-132 on Clotilde, who it seems was to Comte as Harriet was to Mill. Despite his criticism of Comte’s “second [religious] career,” it is very clear that Mill (pp. 133-136) went along with Comte’s idea of religion until it came to the absurd details which aped medieval Catholicism (pp. 149, 154, 158). Mill was one of Ortega’s sources, incidentally, on Comte.
62 At Don Benito in Donoso’s parental home (No. 6, Calle Donoso Cortés), not only his library and papers have been preserved, but also his toupee, his fashionable ivory-handled cane, his ribbons and decorations, and numerous bills from expensive Paris merchants and clothiers that reveal the vanity and tastes of a dandy. At the nearby mansion of a descendant, Señorita Pilar Donoso Cortes, are a large portrait of Donoso by Madrazo y Kunz, one of the better Spanish painters of the era, a complete table service of gold and china emblazoned with “V” (Valdegamas, Donoso’s title of nobility after 1846), purchased by him for use at the Paris Embassy, a handsome Napoleonic-styled clock, etc. (See my Donoso Cortés, pp. 20 [note 3], 76.)
chives yielded up not only a packet of unpublished correspondence with Donoso which has altered somewhat my opinion of his final politics (as more liberal and less authoritarian), but the surroundings also reveal lasting esteem and friendship by the mute evidence of a lithographed portrait of Donoso that hung in the bedroom-study through all the silent years from 1853 to 1871, to the day Montalembert died—remaining, like his papers and calendar, still unchanged today. Such artifacts can tell an observant investigator much that appears not at all, or only dimly and indirectly, in the published writings. In Auguste Comte's case, however, the humdrum furnishings were as orderly and severe as his mind, truly an appropriate environment for his patient, remorseless labors. Visiting the modest Maison d'Auguste Comte thirty-six years before I did, Ortega derived a similar impression, except that the setting seemed to him to conflict outrageously with his "comic" romantic "megalomania": "this poor, balding fellow with a teary eye, with his demeanor of the modest employee, stubbornly persisted, from his lodgings in a third-floor-left apartment, in founding nothing less than a new religion, sum and summit of all earlier ones and in which the role of Supreme Pontiff belonged to him."

VI. Loss and Preservation of Private Libraries

One of the great tragedies for scholarship is the breaking up of an important personal library by testamentary division or for reasons of financial hardship of the individual heir, purchaser, or family involved. This has happened far too many times in history. When a monarch, Parliament, or Congress is unwilling, unable, or tardy in providing the necessary sums to obtain and house such a collection intact, it may be dispensed to the four winds all around the world and become utterly impossible to bring together again, or even to identify more than a few isolated books or manuscripts. Thus Milton's "library" is now mostly, it seems, "ghostly"—a matter of conjecture, surmise, and caprice, as much as solid evidence, but it began to disintegrate even during his lifetime as his daughters sold volumes for "pocket money."

$^{63}$ Ortega, Ob. Compt., V, 219. M. Paulo E. de Berrêdo Carniero, director of the Musée and Société Positiviste, informed me that Ortega had visited Comte's quarters in 1938 but had not established any lasting contact with the society. Ortega's view here is very like Mill, Comte and Positivism, p. 168: The "single pontiff of the whole human race."

$^{64}$ Jackson C. Boswell, Milton's Library: A Catalogue of the Remains of John Milton's
is one of the more fortunate cases, where despite permanent loss of considerable sections, it survived largely intact on paper in Locke's own catalogue and even in its separate physical parts remained at Oxford and in the collection at Ben Dampf Forrest until the latter went on the block in 1936, yet in large part was saved by the purchases of Lord Keynes and Paul Mellon of Virginia, whence it has already, or is destined to be, "reunited" in collections at Oxford and Cambridge. Adam Smith's library, though divided between Scotland and Japan, has mostly survived inheritance problems, earthquake, and the conflagrations of war. Other collections are, of course, far more unfortunate. Perhaps ultimately to go the way of Milton's, for example, may be the fate of the library and papers of Donoso Cortés. What the immediate heirs did not plunder and permanently disperse, or civil war destroy, that remnant of books and papers at Don Benito was intended by Señor Manuel Donoso Cortés (who died without direct heir in 1977) to go to a cousin, the descendant of Juan's brother Pedro, now resident in Madrid. There is the distinct possibility that once uprooted, this final portion will not long survive intact and identifiable. My wife Alsy and I pleaded with him, perhaps in vain, to present the collection intact to the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid, or to some other secure repository—for example, Badajoz University, which had at least established a chair in Donoso's honor. Besides Donoso's diaries, personal papers, and documents, what appear to be the impolitic but often political love letters from Queen María Cristina to Muñoz, which were in Donoso's safekeeping, may also be lost.

Scholars, indeed our individual nations and our whole Western culture, are much the poorer when notable or famous private libraries are lost irreparably, so unnecessarily. If only those dying intestate, or their heirs, would always face up to their cultural responsibility and arrange for the preservation intact of such collections, if only national parliaments were more vigilant and generous with public funds, if only there were more wealthy bibliophile philanthropists, if only . . . , how much

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Library and an Annotated Reconstruction of Milton's Library and Auxilliary Readings (New York and London, 1975); Preface, vii-x: "This conjectural catalogue" does not indicate what, if any, works may survive somewhere physically in a Milton collection.


66 James Bonar, Catalogue of Smith, p. xvii. Tadao Yaraihara, A Full and Detailed Catalogue of Books Which Belonged to Adam Smith, Now In . . . the University of Tokyo (1951; New York, 1966), preface.
richer we and future generations would be for such outlays. In the meanwhile, until we develop a collective historical consciousness of the value of such collections, scholars themselves can do much to preserve or to recover part of our total heritage by cataloguing and making public knowledge what is extant still in such libraries or by carefully reconstructing what is lost into ghost libraries. Far better even this latter poor alternative than to let even available indirect evidences disappear, and then be obliged merely to guess, conjecture, or wonder in vain.