The title of this volume, *Peoples of the River Valleys: The Odyssey of the Delaware Indians*, suggests a Native American perspective on the changing lives and lifeways of the Delaware peoples during the early years of contact. In fact, however, this book is an impeccably researched account that utilizes historical documents generally representing a European, colonialist perspective. Yet, through careful close reading, the author uses these sources to try to construct a more comprehensive understanding of the changing world of the Delaware. Amy Schutt acknowledges this bias dilemma in the prologue and states that indeed it would be ideal to have sources written by the Lenape themselves in order to better understand the impacts of European contact on identity formation. However, she concedes, “the hand of European writers lay heavily on the available documents” (p. 3) and obscured a Native perspective. With a cautionary eye to potential Eurocentric biases, the author provides intriguing accounts of the interactions between Europeans and Delawares, and offers unique interpretations of the meanings of these interactions for Delaware identity.

The book is organized chronologically, but takes a topical approach within that chronological framework. Specifically, the first two chapters focus on Delaware lifeways, including subsistence and settlement patterns, community organization, and belief systems. Of particular interest within these chapters is the author’s interpretations of how land use negotiations may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted by both European settlers and natives. For example, William Penn’s land deeds for areas in and around Philadelphia were intended to represent permanent transfer of land, yet the practice of stretching out payments over time was interpreted by the Delaware as indicative of ongoing relationships cemented through gift-giving (pp. 36-37), suggesting a misunderstanding of the process on both sides of the negotiations. Schutt’s analysis of this kind of documentary evidence throughout the volume is rich and insightful.

Chapters 3 and 4 treat a period of increased interaction between Delawares and Europeans, primarily within Pennsylvania. As Europeans established permanent farms and villages, native peoples were increasingly driven out of their homelands and forced to rely on traditional political and kin networks as they resettled to the west. Established missions and lands reserved for the Delaware and other native communities resulted in pressure to conform to European values. Of course, this resulted in new tensions, which Schutt effectively analyzes through an array of historical and documentary sources.

Chapters 5 and 6 offer insights into the shaping of a new Delaware identity, particularly as many populations were pushed further west into territory traditionally held by other Nations. They consolidated far-flung villages of Delawares through the traditional idea of a “grandfather” (a powerful concept in a society highly respectful of its elders) guiding his grandchildren. Yet by the second half of the eighteenth century, the Delaware had...
become a diverse group, with Christian and non-Christian factions, as well as individuals of mixed European-Indian and African-Indian descent. Schutt places these struggles within a historical context that includes the effects of Pontiac’s War and the American Revolution on Delaware peoples. She concludes with an epilogue that traces the relocation of the Delaware to Indian Territory.

The book would have been strengthened by the use of additional types of evidence— including more archaeology or oral history—but that might be outside the scope and purpose of this volume. Additionally, presentation of sources and notes as footnotes, rather than endnotes, would have been convenient to the scholarly reader. In sum, however, this volume is a well-researched and well-written historical account of the interactions between Europeans and Delawares, as documented in historical texts, and the author offers unique analyses of the effects of these interactions on Delaware identity.

Carolyn Dillian
Princeton University


David W. Jones’s recent book, *Mass Motorization and Mass Transit*, weaves together the history of mass transit, auto ownership, highway building and auto manufacturing in a compelling narrative history of United States transportation policy. The book offers an explanation of why the U.S. relies so heavily on cars and trucks for transportation, why public transit ridership experienced precipitous declines after World War II, and why U.S. automakers are currently in financial trouble. Jones’s analysis of each of these large and long-term changes make this book valuable for students of urban history, public policy, and transportation. Despite its limitations in terms of prescriptions, the book provides a useful transportation history.

Jones argues that streetcar companies had sown their financial ruin during the early decades of the twentieth century, well before the peak and then decline of transit use in the U.S. According to Jones, the failure of private transit companies rested on shortsighted assumptions about fares, inflation, and wages. As each successive assumption was proven wrong, transit companies began a slow drift towards insolvency even as ridership continued to increase. This history covers much of the same ground as Jones’s 1985 book, *Urban Transit Policy: An Economic and Political History*, but the sections on the highways and the auto industry are new.¹

After convincing the reader that the story of public transit’s decline was inevitable, Jones describes the increases in auto ownership and the evolution of highway policy and

design. “Mass motorization” in the title refers to the level of auto ownership in the population, which is higher in the U.S. than in any other country. Automobiles steadily became cheaper and more useful during the first half of the twentieth century. Jones argues that the U.S. was “pervasively” motorized before the interstate highway system was built. His point is that highways did not lead Americans to buy cars but it did encourage them to drive more and to move to suburbs. The combination of “mass motorization,” the building of highways, and the demise of transit leads Jones to conclude that the current land use patterns and rates of auto use are “irreversible.”

The final part of the book addresses the two major challenges to the automobile industry in the coming decades: financial viability and environmental sustainability. Jones draws parallels between the contemporary financial difficulties of US auto companies and the problems faced by transit companies in the early 1900s. Specifically, both industries entered into long-term arrangements that created financial problems, limited revenue, and made reinvestment in new facilities and products difficult. This analysis raises questions about the ability of government programs to assist those auto companies that fail to address these looming problems.

As Congress gears up for a reauthorization of the transportation bill, *Mass Motorization and Mass Transit* is a timely reflection on the history of public transit providers, auto manufactures, and highway planning. Jones’s prescriptions for the twenty-first century, however, lack the nuance with which he describes history. Because Jones views auto dependent suburbs as largely irreversible and focuses narrowly on the problems of externalities, his policy prescriptions primarily address technological solutions for environmental impacts and reducing congestion instead of long term land use changes and major investment in public transit.

*Nick Klein*

*Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy*

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Campbell Soup today is an anomaly, a *Fortune* 500 company located in one of the nation’s poorest cities. Its continued presence in Camden, though secured by ongoing government incentives, has garnered a good deal of good will for the company. Daniel Sidorick’s *Condensed Capitalism*, however, casts the company and its role in a much darker light.

Sidorick’s book is not entirely a balanced account. Its searing assessment of the ways Campbell relentlessly cut costs of production by speeding up work, fighting unions, and pitting workers in different plants against one another is deeply critical of management and sympathetic to labor. Because his language sometimes assumes a stridency that
reflects the tone of the many organizing campaigns directed at the company, some readers might be tempted to dismiss the work as polemical. That would be a mistake. Sidorick’s research is so thorough and his arguments so compelling that he prompts reassessment, not just of Campbell Soup but the way historians have treated business history in New Jersey and elsewhere.

The Campbell story is generally familiar. Starting in 1869, the entrepreneur Joseph Campbell took advantage of southern New Jersey’s farmland to reap rich harvests, especially tomatoes, to make a variety of products, including ketchup, mincemeat, and preserves. Reorganization in 1882 brought Arthur Dorrence into partnership in the company, and upon Campbell’s death, Dorrence assumed the presidency in 1894. From the research of Dorrence’s young nephew, John, the company pioneered condensed soup, grabbing and maintaining a huge market share by keeping the cost of the familiar red and white cans consistent at 10 cents each.

It was Arthur Dorrence’s obsession with maintaining the price of soup at a dime, Sidorick reports, that dominated company policy throughout much of Campbell’s early history. Although the company ultimately turned to mechanization where it could, much of the work of production initially was done by hand by large numbers of workers. To contain costs, the company actively segmented the labor force, by gender as well as by age, paying women and boys lower rates than men, even if the work was the same. Additionally, the company relied heavily on temporary workers during the peak tomato season. Although some temporary help ultimately landed long-term jobs, only those who proved most productive during seasonal work were hired on.

To discipline the workforce, the company introduced a variation on scientific management, as introduced early in the twentieth century by Fredrick Winslow Taylor, to maximize efficiency. In 1927, Campbell introduced the Bedaux system, which set detailed standards of production for every worker in the plant. Those who exceeded the standard received bonuses; those who fell short were penalized. Although the system invented by Charles Bedaux was based on nothing more than what Sidorick terms “pseudo-scientific hand waving,” its rigid application by the company had the effect of speeding up the work and assuring higher profits.

The Bedaux system remained in place more than fifty years, despite workers’ consistent resistance to its debilitating effects. In the 1930s, the system became a particular object of attack from nascent union organizing efforts at the plant, but the company held on to its control of production, re-enforcing model practice with a rigid supervisory system that rooted out troublemakers who encouraged workers to slow down or to otherwise subvert the system.

During the New Deal period, when unions finally achieved the right to organize, the company maintained its resistance by organizing a company union to compete with outside organizations. The formation of a canner’s union, ultimately known as Local 80 in its affiliation with the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, proved a formidable opponent to the company, however. Driven by a vision not
just of higher wages but greater social justice, the union pressed for equal pay for women as well as equal rights for the growing number of African American employees, who were typically directed into the most physically taxing and lowest paying jobs.

Local 80 typified an inclusionary approach to organizing characteristic of CIO unions in the 1930s. Although Campbell successfully resisted demands for equal pay and a formal antidiscrimination clause in its contracts with workers, the union did succeed in striking for better pay in 1946. Stymied by a no-strike clause in their contract during World War II, the union tried again to advance its broad agenda once the war was over. At this point, one cause of the union’s earlier success, notably the leadership of known communists, came back to haunt organizing efforts. Although communist leadership was home-grown and hardly beholden to Moscow, the company successfully leveraged postwar anticomunist hysteria to cripple union leadership and block its postwar demands, which still included abandonment of the hated Bedaux system.

Sidorick’s account of the trials different unions underwent in the postwar years is thorough and more detailed than the general reader will welcome, but the overall effect was significant. The backlash against New Deal collectivism after the war, exemplified by the 1946 Taft-Hartley Act, weakened labor’s bargaining power. At Campbell Soup, management gained additional strength by diversification of its production facilities.

One of the reasons Sidorick selected Campbell Soup as a case study was to examine the ways corporations could manage costs without resorting to relocating their plants to areas where wages could be expected to be lower, a strategy Jefferson Cowie describes in charting the twentieth-century corporate strategies employed by another Camden corporation, RCA Victor. Campbell did open other plants outside of New Jersey, starting in Chicago in 1929. By the late 1950s, the company operated multiple plants, and now its labor strategy included a determination to prevent workers at different plants from uniting. When workers struck, the company managed to maintain production elsewhere through overtime employment, and profits did not suffer. Now the company added the threat that workers in the older Camden and Chicago plants might lose out entirely to more modernized plants elsewhere where the labor was also cheaper. The company’s job was made easier by different union representation at its various plants and its ability to stagger contracts between different locations. When the unions did manage to join together to demand unified contract deliberations in 1968, the company absolutely refused to oblige.

Although Sidorick paints a picture of unified action as heroic, the strike ultimately took its toll, one that is foreshadowed on the book’s cover by a picture of the company’s main production plant in Camden imploding, its four huge water towers in the form of the company’s emblematic cans toppling to the ground. Campbell shut down production in Camden in 1989, transferring the work to its plant in Maxton, North Carolina. Perhaps the shift was inevitable. As of 1979, the company had abandoned its use of the once preferred South Jersey tomato, utilizing instead California crops that could be harvested mechanically. Still, the decision finally to abandon production represented another blow
to the city of Camden, already reeling from the loss of most of the rest of its blue collar jobs.

Sidorick’s story emerges mostly out of a conscientious review of labor history at Campbell’s, a story that has not been attempted previously in such depth. To marshal his evidence, he has tapped an impressive range of sources, including federal agencies as well as labor archives around the country. Campbell’s own archives have delivered much less, quite understandably, since the company does not allow access to personnel records. To garner evidence on that experience, Sidorick relied on oral interviews and some personal papers, most notably those given by organizer John Tisa gave historian Vicki Ruiz for her 1987 history of the canning industry. Sidorick manages, however, to find some compelling information about the company by mining the papers of its public relations firm, Earl Newsome and Company. Clearly his criticism of Campbell’s anti-union strategy does not rely on the accounts of workers alone; Campbell left its own record through directives to counter union activity as it attempted to burnish its own image.

Two years ago, Campbell’s requested government assistance to expand its Camden headquarters. The plan included demolition of a historically protected building to make way for a modern office park on land held by the company. When opposition to the proposed demolition emerged, the company threatened to move out of the state, thereby prompting New Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection, which had ultimate jurisdiction, to overturn the recommendations against demolition from two historic review panels. Campbell can be expected to stay in Camden, although it still faces additional review on the proposed demolition. With its charitable contributions to city organizations and its sponsorship of a homeowner’s academy for low-income residents and a minor league ballpark, Campbell retains a good image in the region, and the loss of a historic structure will not change that. The deeper implication of Sidorick’s book, however, is that Campbell’s own history matters. Even as the company has kept its headquarters in New Jersey, its historical legacy remains mixed. Sidorick’s study has revealed some of the costs of success and, in the process, set a high standard for future scholarly work on industrial development.

Howard Gillette
Rutgers University-Camden


For many years, New Jersey had one of the densest rail networks in the country and still boasts one of its most robust commuter rail systems, so the history of this infrastructure is a major element in the story of the state’s economic and social development. Accordingly, the subject has received excellent coverage over the years in everything from dissertations to picture books. It is this literature that the author, a retired
mechanical engineer who has written on nineteenth century locomotive technology, attempts to summarize in what is basically an economically-priced introduction to the subject.

The book is best described by its subtitle, in that the author has chosen to cover the history of rail transportation in New Jersey from its beginnings in the 1820s to the present day in a series of thirty-three discrete “tales.” The format results in something akin to a Whitman sampler rather than a unified narrative, and the reader is likely to find some of the nuggets more appealing than others. Judging from the bibliography, the works being sampled range from original nineteenth century pamphlets, through well-researched scholarly or antiquarian monographs, to popular journalism, coffee table books, and other works of more questionable accuracy. The problem with tales, of course, is that they are often embellished in the telling and require a certain amount of polish to grab attention. Thus one finds a large amount of colorful reportage of accidents, brawls, and oddities, along with samples of the sentimental bad poetry favored by local antiquarians of a century ago, along with more serious research.

The tales, for the most part, are reasonably well chosen, and include the expected big events: John Stevens and his pioneer locomotive of 1825; the Camden & Amboy and the locomotive John Bull; Paterson as a locomotive-building center; the flight of Jay Gould and the other Erie Railway looters to Jersey City to escape arrest; the death of President James Garfield at Elberon; the development of New Jersey Transit; the preservation of historic stations; and the building of modern light rail lines. Unfortunately, the text is marred by just enough errors of fact, date, and geography to be irritating, especially as these could have been corrected with some additional editing. The author clearly relied on the assistance of a limited number of local authors, and most of them seem to have come from the southern part of the state. Accuracy declines as one moves north of Trenton.

To be fair, some of the book’s limitations have been imposed by the publisher in the name of economy. Photos are few and on plain paper stock. The illustrations seem to have been chosen from a few private collections or are old line drawings that are presumably in the public domain rather than the one or two images that might best illustrate the matter under discussion. More serious in an introductory work is the lack of an adequate map. There are only two, a tiny outline locating some of the towns mentioned in the text without any rail lines, and a schematic diagram of the current New Jersey Transit system.

It is difficult to judge this book’s intended audience. Persons interested in the subject will have read more specialized studies. It may serve as a useful introduction, possibly for out-of-state readers, but its errors must weigh against it. In some ways it is a more

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2 A catalog of the book’s most serious errors follows: 1) Major John Wilson, the engineer of the Camden & Amboy, was born in Scotland and was not a West Point graduate. 2) The Camden & Amboy never leased the New Jersey Railroad; there was an informal pooling of profits in 1867. 3) Ashbel Welch for most of his career was chief engineer of only the Delaware & Raritan Canal. He was chief engineer of the entire Joint Companies only in the years 1864-71. He was never a vice president of the PRR. 4) The North River
sophisticated updating of John T. Cunningham’s *Railroading in New Jersey*, a journalistic work published by the railroad industry as part of a public relations drive for legislative relief. However, Cunningham wrote when the state’s rail infrastructure was still close to its maximum, and his readers, this reviewer included, could recognize the historical connection to things that were still part of their daily lives. So much has changed, that readers under the age of fifty would probably need more interpretive explanations of how railroads once brought the coal to heat homes, food to market, and people to work or vacations “down the shore” and what has since taken their place. Today, the west shore of Newark Bay is piled high with shipping containers, the Hudson is relatively empty of commercial traffic, and the former rail yards on its Jersey shore are now the site of parks and high-rise luxury condos. To explain this transformation requires more than a collection of tales.

Christopher T. Baer
Hagley Museum and Library


Biography has recently become quite fashionable. The founding fathers have received the greatest attention, but historians have also carefully reconstructed the lives of lesser-known figures with great success. In *The Beautiful Soul of John Woolman, Apostle of Abolition*, Thomas P. Slaughter brilliantly captures the essence of a lesser-known colonial figure.

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Bridge was proposed by bridge designer Gustav Lindenthal as an independent project. It was not proposed by the PRR, although PRR vice president Samuel Rea was an old friend of Lindenthal’s and supported the project on his own initiative but without success. 5) The description by Robert Louis Stevenson of crossing the Hudson on a railroad ferry omits the fact that Stevenson was traveling on an emigrant ticket. In return for very low fares, emigrants were basically herded like cattle and kept separate from other classes of passengers. Hence, the experience of ordinary passengers would be different. 6) The Erie’s Jersey City terminal opened in 1861, not 1869. 7) The account of the names and duties of the various companies that built the present PATH tubes and that operated the Camden ferries is garbled. 8) The Blue Comet was the last passenger train on the Central RR Co. of NJ south of Lakehurst, not on the entire Southern Division. 9) The date of the Central RR Co. of NJ’s Newark Bay Bridge is incorrect in two places. 10) Jay Gould was ousted from the Erie Railway in 1872, not 1879. 11) The Yardley bridge over the Delaware River is confused with the Neshaminy Falls bridge, which is about 8-10 miles further south in Bucks County. 12) Greenville is the southern part of Jersey City and not near Point Pleasant. 13) Bergen Point and Communipaw are separate places approximately 6 miles apart. The filling of land by the Central RR Co. of NJ with New York City garbage and street sweepings was done at Communipaw Cove, the present Liberty State Park, although the text implies it was done at Bayonne also. 14) The description of the old Central RR Co. of NJ terminal in Liberty State Park at one point describes the Bush train shed as being part of the original construction and in another correctly as an addition in 1913-14.

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According to Slaughter, John Woolman’s legacy as a founding father of American abolition places him in the same historical rank as Martin Luther King and other civil rights luminaries. Organizing his book chronologically, Slaughter closely examines Woolman’s writings, the most of important of which was his Journal. Carefully addressing the tropes of spiritual biographies, Slaughter peels back the layers of self-fashioning and unveils an incredibly human “saint.” His aim “is to achieve a tone of critical empathy,” (p. 9) but it is clear Slaughter greatly admires Woolman.

Slaughter portrays Woolman’s journey to “sainthood” as a young boy. Rambunctious and undisciplined, he underwent the first of his spiritual awakenings when, out of boredom, he killed a bird. The ensuing guilt pushed him toward a more pious life. As a young adult, he gradually espoused an ascetic lifestyle and began to reflect seriously upon the moral and spiritual direction of Quakers and society in general. For Woolman, slavery was mankind’s most egregious moral crime. Woolman used the tactics of moral suasion to convince slaveholders to manumit their slaves, while removing the implicit insult this tactic implied. How could one be upset when Woolman claimed the only reason one owned slaves is that they loved their children too much? According to Woolman, slavery denied slaves spiritual growth and destroyed marriages, while fostering sloth, vanity, vice, cruelty, and general immorality among slaveholders. By the time he reached his forties, Woolman had come to lament the growth of the market society. Unlike others who perceived materialism as the cause of moral decline, “Woolman believed that it was moral decline that caused market growth and the desire for riches” (p. 316). Americans’ spiritual decline ushered in a new worldview: to acquire goods, to get ahead, and to attain property to bequeath to their children. Slaughter leaves the reader to wonder whether Woolman had simply become a reactionary curmudgeon, unable to cope with modernity, or a prophet, warning society of impending doom.

Slaughter is at his best uncovering the intellectual and cultural context in which Woolman grew, but one may find his construction of Woolman’s physical environment lacking. Although he provides several maps and briefly discusses some of his social connections, we get little information regarding the people with whom he spent the greatest amount of time: his family and neighbors. His wife and children appear aloof and nondescript. Slaughter might have explored the ways in which they shaped Woolman’s opinions and he shaped theirs. Furthermore, most of the earliest efforts to eradicate slavery and the slave trade originated among individuals with strong connections to the Jerseys. Why? Was this a coincidence? Slaughter’s book adds little to this discussion. In addition, Slaughter provides very little analysis of Woolman’s ideas on race. Like many of the early abolitionists, Woolman believed slavery was a stain on the moral fabric of America. By removing that stain, America would then be in the good graces of God. However, most early abolitionists made no pretension to racial equality. Quakers themselves did not allow African-Americans into the fold until 1798. This was largely due to the fear of racial amalgamation. Finally, some historians may cringe as Slaughter employs psycho-historical theory, without which – in this reviewer’s opinion – a book of this nature would have been impossible to write.
Nevertheless, Slaughter’s book is eloquent. Largely free of professional jargon and written in a narrative style, this is intellectual history at its best. Anyone interested in the roots of early abolition, the life of John Woolman, or Quakerism should read this work. Thomas Slaughter indeed wrote a beautiful book.

Timothy Hack  
Salem Community College


Despite being involved in all of the Army of the Potomac’s major campaigns, the First New Jersey Brigade lacks a modern champion, forcing historians to rely on Camille Baquet’s 1910 *History of the First Brigade.* 5 Bradley Gottfried’s *Kearny’s Own* steps into the breach with a narrative military history of the brigade, although the results are somewhat mixed.

Gottfried, a zoologist by training and president of the College of Southern Maryland, has scoured the archives for letters and diaries of members of the First New Jersey Brigade. The notes section of the book reveals over forty collections of primary source material which gives the book its most important quality – a personal connection with the soldiers of the brigade throughout the Civil War years. The author has made extensive use of newspapers from the period as well as published primary accounts, to create an “as it happened” feel in much of the book.

*Kearny’s Own* begins with the raising of the original four regiments of the New Jersey Brigade (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th New Jersey Infantry) and the limited part they played in the first Battle of Bull Run. The book follows the regiment from northern Virginia to the battles of the Peninsular and Seven Days campaigns, where the Fourth New Jersey “had a fight that it would never forget” (p. 55). That fight resulted in the surrender of most of the regiment to Confederate forces. Gottfried is at his strongest when he details these battles. His narratives, aided by maps, are clear, allowing the reader to follow the ebb and flow of the fighting.

Gottfried covers events off the battlefields as well. Civil War soldiers spent most of their time away from battle, and the book provides a fascinating look at the day-to-day life of the soldiers. Gottfried notes that “demoralization gripped the army, and the pace of desertions reached alarming levels” in the aftermath of General Ambrose Burnside’s failed “Mud March” in January 1863 (p. 99). Supplies became a problem and “boredom became unbearable as the winter wore on” (p. 100). Despite the problems of the winter of 1863, the New Jersey Brigade endured and continued the fight through 1865. Gottfried also covers the reenlistment of the men in December 1863. The first four New Jersey regiments had enlisted for three years and their time in service was almost over. In an

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effort to keep these veteran soldiers the government offered bonuses for reenlistees. Although the Fourth New Jersey reenlisted almost to a man, the “numbers reenlisting were less impressive in the First, Second, and Third NJV, as most of their men had had their fill of war” (p. 152).

There are some problems, however, with the book. It begins with an unfortunate error, giving the date of the surrender of Fort Sumter as April 17, 1861. Gottfried details the marches of the brigade town by town, which occasionally gets tedious and can be difficult to follow without better maps. Perhaps most disappointing is the lack of engagement with some of the important secondary works on the war. Gottfried misses a chance to analyze the men of the First New Jersey Brigade in light of works such as James McPherson’s For Cause and Comrades and Gerald Linderman’s Embattled Courage. There is a lack of analysis throughout the book, especially on the social aspects of the army and the changes in the way soldiers felt about the war.

Despite these faults, Kearny’s Own is nevertheless a notable addition to the historiography of New Jersey in the Civil War. Academics may be disappointed that the book doesn’t delve into the social history of the war, but Gottfried has done an excellent job of producing an operational history of the First New Jersey Brigade.

John Marchetti
New Jersey Lincoln Bicentennial Commission


John B. Wefing, professor of law at Seton Hall University in Newark, has written a cradle-to-grave biography of Richard J. Hughes, two-term Democratic governor of New Jersey from 1962 to 1970. He served as chief justice of the state supreme court from 1973 to 1979, and was the only ex-governor to hold both positions. He was the first governor of the Catholic faith since 1776, when the state was founded. And apart from Woodrow Wilson early in the twentieth century, he was the only governor of New Jersey to gain national renown.

Wefing, a long-time friend of Hughes and his family, had access to their papers and those of others in public and private life to research his book. It explains how a descendant of Irish immigrants who came to America to escape the Great Famine of the mid-nineteenth century, and were of modest means, could rise to high office and gain the respect of friends and foes alike for doggedness, humanity, and public service.

The Hughes family settled in Florence, a small factory town along the Delaware River west of Trenton, where Hughes’ father worked in a foundry and was active in the Democratic Party in heavily Republican rural Burlington County. Richard J. Hughes was born on August 10, 1909, the eldest of four children. He was strongly influenced by his father, whom Wefing describes as “not well educated” but “intelligent,” with “a great love for reading… and passionate about politics” (6). This helped him to rise in the state Democratic Party and secure a postmaster’s job in the Roosevelt administration during the 1930’s.

Young Richard J. imbibe his father’s aversion to dogmatism in politics and his belief that one should split a ticket to support the better candidate. After graduating from Rutgers University Law School and passing the bar (on his second try), he struggled to make a living, rose in the ranks of the state Democratic Party, and, in 1939, was appointed an Assistant United States Attorney. His breakthrough came when he successfully prosecuted a case against a German-American organization charged as a cover for a propaganda agency of Nazi Germany. His courtroom presentation concentrated on the legal issue rather than the patriotic one, and earned a plaudit from the presiding judge. His poor eyesight disqualified him from military service after Pearl Harbor. In the meantime, he worked with Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague and New Jersey Democratic Party state chairman Thorn Lord to revive the party’s stature in Mercer County, where Hughes had become county chairman. Wefing’s narrative of the political intricacies of those years may try the patience of some readers, but is necessary to understand how the young Hughes won respect as an attorney, a government official, and a reliable colleague in politics.

The subtitle of Wefing’s book is “The Politics of Civility.” It is a fitting, concise description of Hughes’ behavior in winning the hard-fought gubernatorial campaigns and in hobnobbing with New Jerseyans from average citizens to the highest officials in the state. It carried him to high office and to friendships with movers and shakers in business and of varied political persuasions. This was visible in two major events involving Hughes within less than one month of each other in 1967. The first was Hughes’ initiative in arranging a meeting between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Russia’s Premier Alexei N. Kosygin on June 23-25 at Glassboro State College. Kosygin was the first Soviet leader to visit the United States for a United Nations meeting since Nikolai Khruschev’s tour in 1959. The logistics and security arrangements had to be taken care of, along with food service and arrangements for the two leaders’ families. To the credit of Hughes, his wife, Betty, the President and his wife, and dozens of other Americans involved, all went well. No new diplomatic agreements were concluded, but, for a short time, New Jersey and Hughes were on the front pages with general agreement that New Jersey had done itself proud.

The second event was unexpected and frightening. It occurred from July 12 to 16, with charges of police brutality against blacks, street demonstrations, complaints that city officials were neglecting their sworn duties and responsibilities toward the black community, and a frantic phone call by Newark’s mayor to the governor that the situation was getting out of control. Hughes activated the state police and the National Guard and
ordered them to restore civil peace. The National Guard proved to be a frightened, overwhelmingly white, trigger-happy force. Fires and looting spread, and twenty-three people died of the violence.

The governor, it seemed, knew little of the smoldering resentment by Newark’s black citizens and of the justice of their cause. He uttered the words that echoed around the world: “The line between the jungle and the law might as well be drawn here as any place in America” (171).

Wefing’s account of the course of the riots and of black grievances is accurate, but his claim that Hughes “made the mistake of referring to ‘the jungle’” (171) is a simplification of the backlash against him. Rather, the riots revealed the state’s neglect of the National Guard’s training, its heavily white ranks, and its ignorance of the state’s big cities. In the urban areas, there was organized crime at Newark’s City Hall and the forced displacement of blacks from their homes without adequate, safe, and sanitary relocation housing, plus an antiquated and segregated public school system riven by cronyism and racial prejudice in promotions and assignments.

To Hughes’ credit, he realized his rush to judgment and took steps to remedy the state’s shortcomings toward its cities. He initiated the investigation in *Report for Action*, which became a classic of its genre. He won a $58.5 million appropriation from a largely suburban-and small-town dominated legislature to address urban problems. During Hughes’ service on the State Supreme Court, he supported directives on the duty of local school districts to fulfill their constitutional obligations toward public schooling.

Richard Hughes died on December 7, 1992, at age eighty-three. Wefing treats his final ailments and death with the same simplicity, clarity, and dignity that he displays throughout his study. It belongs in every New Jersey library and in the home of anyone interested in a great man whose life is perpetuated in this outstanding book.

*Stanley B. Winters*
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